A challenging Presidency of a Union strained by a war-challenged member state

In January 2026, the Republic of Cyprus assumed the rotating presidency of the EU Council. This marked Cyprus’ second presidency, and expectations were high, given the particularly ambitious presidency goals set by a small member state located at Europe’s geographical periphery.

Cyprus’ presidency happens at a moment of profound transformation and challenge. It takes place within a framework of twin major transitions: the green and the digital. And further, within these, at a time of significant energy security disruptions post-Ukraine war and during a war in the Gulf and the Middle East; extreme climate conditions in the Mediterranean; accelerated water stress; and the need for resilient transport and connectivity.

Within this context, Cyprus was posed to have a unique opportunity to shape the EU agenda and at the same time promote its national interests by virtue of a few key parameters: its island geography; its renewables potential; its connectivity constraints; and its regional positioning. Focusing the presidency on environmental adaptation and climate extremes, water resilience, energy transition and transport connectivity, were set to leave a significant mark. The presidency could advance the EU’s broader goals: energy security, territorial cohesion, climate resilience, connectivity, and competitiveness. At the same time, it could serve as a blueprint for how island states and peripheral regions can lead on green transition, mobility innovation and digital connectivity, thereby reinforcing the EU’s strategic autonomy and global standing. In the longer run, this could well pave the way to the EU’s ambition to become more geopolitical.

The declared objectives of the Cyprus presidency have been advancing green and digital transitions; ensuring energy security; sustainable agriculture; reinforcing EU relations with neighbouring regions and the Middle East; and supporting Ukraine. On many of these priorities, Cyprus is both uniquely placed to highlight them at the European level and has a distinctive leverage on them. The country suffers from chronic water problems, pertaining to scarcity, droughts, soil aridity, rainfall challenges and the resulting pressures on agriculture. Extreme climate phenomena tend to become the norm in the region where Cyprus is located, and adaptation is fast becoming an existential issue. This is shaping the Mediterranean agenda and Cyprus’ own experience stands proof at EU level, the urgency of action. Wildfires, coastal erosion, biodiversity loss, urban heat, terrorism and rural depopulation are real challenges for the entire East Mediterranean and Cyprus alike.

Similar vulnerabilities characterize the fields of energy, connectivity and transport. As an island state, Cyprus faces isolation, mobility constraints and limited interconnections. It is the only country in the region that is not connected to any other state or electricity grid, aside from limited connectivity to the Turkish Cypriot grid in the island’s north. More recent attempts to establish connectivity to Greece and possibly Israel via submarine cable (the “Great Sea Interconnector – GSI” project) remain unsuccessful, due to a mix of economic, technical and geopolitical challenges. It has a very poor renewables record and fails to achieve its great solar potential; it fares way below even, say, the Netherlands that has nothing close to Cyprus’ sunny days annual total. Maritime and aviation connectivity shortages are also pronounced. Cyprus is the only EU Member State without regular direct flights to the Union’s capital, Brussels. Finally, competitiveness and cohesion form another set of areas of concern best represented by Cyprus’ situation as a small, remote member state emphasizing gaps in and the need for the further strengthening of territorial, economic and social cohesion.

Against this backdrop, Cyprus has both the motivation and credibility to act decisively as the EU Council presidency holder for the first semester of 2026. By doing so, it will manage to tick many boxes: addressing serious domestic challenges; serving as a bridge and honest broker between Brussels and the Eastern Mediterranean/Middle East region bringing the concerns, considerations and sensitivities of each to the other; and in doing so also help restore the EU’s image, perception and credibility in the region which are seriously tarnished and allow it to gain more leverage and impact.

Barely had the presidency begun when the Israel/US-Iran war broke out. The conflict touches upon all the above issues, pushing them to their limits and introducing new ones. It directly affected the European Union and carried grave actual and potential consequences for its present and future, its current reality as well as its vision as embodied by the institution of the Council presidency, the targets and the member state executing it.

Early in the conflict, Cyprus was struck by a drone. Although technically the target was one of the two British Sovereign Bases on the island, Cyprus territory and Republic of Cyprus airspace were violated. Viewed through the prism of Cyprus’ EU presidency, the incident acquired far broader significance. Although not directly targeted, the heart of the EU was hit and institutional EU reactions were measured and, in the view of some critics, lukewarm, relying largely on limited military support from a small number of individual Member States. This served as a stark reminder of Cyprus’ exposed geography and as a test of European solidarity.

Both this incident and a smaller averted one near Paphos airport, as well as the broader regional conflict, have affected Cyprus directly and indirectly, and they are posed to have short, medium and long-term consequences for the island, the EU more broadly especially through the presidency, and the Cyprus problem itself.

In the short to medium term, Cyprus’ physical and geographical vulnerability has become clear. Beyond the attack on the UK base and the disruption near Paphos airport, these events evoked memories of earlier direct threats against Cyprus, including statements by Nasrallah in June 2024, and by IRGC official Sardar Jabberi in March 2026. It also reminded Cypriots of their exposure to accidents, such as when a Syrian S-200 rogue missile hit the mountain near the capital Nicosia in July 2019. The incidents had a direct effect on Cyprus’ already limited connectivity, with one of the two airports temporarily closing and hundreds of flight cancellations. The EU presidency itself took a hit, with all physical EU meetings planned cancelled and replaced by online virtual sessions throughout March.

Tourism, Cyprus’ largest source of state revenue, and a sector that normally begins its annual cycle in March, represents another area of concern. Despite government efforts, it appears highlight likely that tourism will suffer a severe blow in 2026 due to the war. Cyprus also faces economic and supply chain challenges on the energy front, in particular through its heavy dependency on diesel and mazut for electricity generation and desalination. This is also expected to bring inflationary pressures. Additionally, the state came under fire and public scrutiny regarding serious civil protection shortcomings, including shelter shortages, the absence of early warning mechanisms and safety protocol issues. Finally, potential exposure to terrorism, migration and similar asymmetric challenges are areas of extra concern. The most consequential effects, however, may lie in the long term. Beyond the immediate hostilities, destruction and loss of life in the Gulf, the broader Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean, the war risks claiming a broader victim in the form of international law, institutions and processes. Critics argue that the conflict represents the last nail in the coffin of the post-WW2 rules-based international order, international legal rules and the UN system through its disregard or bypassing, as well as the normalization of the exception and the legitimization of previously sanctioned or controversial practices. This can fundamentally undermine the UN-led peace process in Cyprus. Further, to countries like Cyprus that have tried for decades to build a foreign policy – or at least its narrative – on international law, against much stronger and revisionist adversaries, this development can have serious consequences. Taken together, these dynamics place the Republic of Cyprus, as EU Council presidency holder, in an exceptionally challenging position. This is so without addressing the island’s political problem (the “Cyprus issue”), its regional security repercussions, and a host of connected issues. These include  the unprecedented military buildup on and around Cyprus; renewed controversial discussions regarding the Republic of Cyprus potentially joining NATO; the fate of the UK Sovereign Bases; the destiny of approximately 12,000 Iranians in northern Cyprus who, due to the war, have effectively become refugees.

At the same time, these challenges also highlight the potential benefits of, if not indeed the necessity for, local and regional cooperation. Greek and Turkish Cypriots are united by the bonds of common suffering caused or accentuated by the war, from security, energy, and water to migration, tourism and economics. The case for cooperation between the two communities has rarely been stronger. By minimizing tensions and maximizing areas of practical cooperation, both sides can more effectively address urgent challenges that cannot await a comprehensive political settlement. The present critical situation warrants it, and the EU Council presidency offers a unique opportunity to pursue it.

• Harry Tzimitras is the Director of the PRIO Cyprus Centre